The Ayatollah Has Spoken

This is it. From now on the situation has become even more dangerous. Ayatollah Khamenei's unfailing support for Ahmadinejad at the friday prayers in Teheran today means the hardliners will not go without a fight. The rhetoric blaming foreign influence and downplaying the size and legitimacy of protests continues in an attempt to unite the masses behind the official election results. As busses moved in on Teheran carrying thousands of loyal hardline supporters from the countryside, hardline Basij militia have been seen preparing checkpoints over the city in preparation for planned and spontaneous weekend protests.
The 12 man council of Guardians who oversee the elections and have the last say in confirming the election results are Khamenei loyal.
The Council of Experts headed by Rafsanjani are not pleased with the election but will not do anything to dethrone the Ayatollah through the legal means.
The Ayatollah has now taken his stand and wagered all his political power on Ahmadinejad.
If protests continue unabated as can be expected, he will have to do something about it. The secret police have been detaining high profile opposition leaders in the hundreds throughout the week, to little effect on the size of protests.
The events of the latest week can not be compared to the events that lead to the fall of the Shah. The system of a clerically controlled democracy is not currently in itself under fire, at least officially, that would be dangerous and alienate too many people. The revolution is green, the color of Islam, and the movement uses the acronym gr88, as in green revolution in the persian year 1388. This is a clever positioning that makes it possible to cast the protesters as the true mass defenders of the system already in place. Even amid sporadic shouting of "Death to the dictator", the islamic republican system in itself is not questioned by just as many protesters shouting "God is great", and the only real political demands so far from the opposition has been to call for a re-election, not the end of religious rule. The main figures of the opposition are after all some of the founding fathers of the islamic republic, partly responsible themselves for massacres of thousands of political prisoners that protested against the regime in its first years.
What happens if reforms actually are pushed through is another thing. Once the grip starts to loosen, the regime might very well see things slip out of control fast and the entire political system in Iran crumble. But this is not what we are seeing quite yet. And a win for the opposition does not automatically mean the introduction of western style democracy, bikinis and beer in the streets. At top political level, all we have seen so far is a contest between different white haired members of the old guard from the revolution, the fact that some are reformist does not make them less religious. Some people internationally as well as locally, with high hopes about american style freedoms, may very well be quite disappointed if the opposition really pulls through.
The situation can now go a number of ways. Let's speculate on a few scenarios:
1 Nothing happens. The protesters grow tired and go home after two weeks of daily protests and Ahmadinejad rules four more years. People who have spoken out publicly are rounded up by the secret police in hundreds and tortured.
2 The Ayatollah has already ruled out backing down on Ahmadinejad. The compromise end with everybody sitting down and agreeing to have a rerun of the elections or rule together seems more and more unlikely.
3 The relevant authorities might allow for a reelection. Different people in high places tired of Ahmadinejad get enough backing to talk sense into the Council of Guardians This outcome could be possible if the protests keep their massive mainstream, pacifist character. It would seriously challenge the divine authority of the Ayatollah and might herald future more deeper reforms or possible collapse of the political system.
4 The protestors may overrun and overwhelm prisons, government buildings and Basiji command posts. This would require more audacity and brutality than we have yet seen in earlier protests. It could happen as a reaction if Basiji or IRGC starts murdering more protesters. It would follow a pattern of other regime changes in eastern european countries, and in Iran we have seen it when protesters besieged Basiji headquarters. So far it has ended in deaths. To be successful it would require that the Basiji and the IRGC all stand back and refuse to kill their fellow men and women even in the face of losing control of important buildings. And if they don't there are always the freshly flown in arab militants ready to fight for their loyalist employers. For all the signs of some singular shows of support among IRGC, this is a big wager for the opposition and might end in serious massacres.
5 The army goes into action on the constitutionally legal grounds of protecting the nation from foreign forces illegally employed within it's border, ie arab militants from Iraq, Palestine or Lebanon presently helping the Basiji as volunteers. The IRGC stands back or joins. Brief streetfighting gives way to detention of Basiji and foreign militants, as well as nationwide arrests of people responsible, some commanders, and possibly Ahmadinejad himself. This is a long shot but might still happen if the crackdown becomes violent and arab militants play a large part in it.
6 The worst option is of course that Ahmadinejad loyal Basiji, IRGC, and foreign militants all descend upon peaceful demonstrations in a massive show of force, making a massacre that would make Tienanmen Square fade in comparison, and then start making thousands of arrests, torturing people and condemning them to death by hanging from cranes in mass spectacles to state an example. A generation loses interest in politics and hope in change and the system stands unchallenged for at least another ten years.
The next days will be crucial to see what direction the development will take.